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Abstract
In this paper, I consider the question of personal identity, namely: in virtue of what is one
person the same person at two different points in time? I first raise objections to theories which
argue it is in virtue of physical continuity or continuity soul, then argue that an account of
psychological continuity is most successful. One might object to psychological continuity on the
grounds of reduplication and fusion problems. I argue that strict numerical identity is a bar set
too high and rather that survival (construed as the continuation of a first-person perspective) is
what matters for personal identity. I then propose an account of psychological continuity which
depends upon survival and demonstrate how it can overcome objections previously raised to
views of psychological continuity. Finally, I defend this conception of survival against objections
(such as gaps in one’s perspective) and conclude that psychological continuity based on survival
best accounts for personal identity.

This paper will consider the diachronic question of personal identity: what makes one the
same person over time? Asking this question first raises another question: why should we care
about personal identity? Whether or not one is, and how one is, the same person over time has
many different real-life implications––for example, in most “normal” cases, punishments and
rewards both presuppose that the recipient is the same person who committed the act warranting
reward or punishment. Further, many relations within society assume this as well; we assume our
spouse is the same person we married years ago, we assume our president is the same person we
elected years ago, that we are the same person with a degree is the one who earned it years ago,
that the person who has a job is the same person who got hired for that job, etc. We do assume
that there is some type of personal identity over time (demonstrable by such practical points
where we act as though there is), but this raises the question of how it is possible for two
different things to be identical. If two things do not have all and only the same properties, they
are not strictly identical, and thus we have the question of what exactly accounts for some person
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being the same over two different times. Some argue that what answers this question is a matter
of physical continuity, while others argue it is some “further fact” (something like a soul or a
bare particular). I argue that both of these theories fail, and instead propose that psychological
continuity is the best answer to the question of how one is the same person over time. The
standard objection to the psychological continuity view is by raising the problems of
reduplication and fusion. I reply to this objection by first developing and then defending a
survival account of psychological continuity, as opposed to numerical identity, to solve the
problem; on this survival account, survival is construed as the continuation of a first-person
perspective, which can (I think) solve these problem cases.
Broadly, there are three main views about personal identity, what I will label the physical
continuity view, the psychological continuity view, and the soul view. The first of these, the
physical continuity view, posits that what makes one the same person over time is a continuity in
one’s physical states, most commonly seen as continuity in one’s body (though other versions,
such as the brain theory or animalism, do exist) (Kind, 2017, 73; cf. Baker, 2008, 372-3). Next,
there is the view that what accounts of personal identity is psychological continuity. On this
view, what accounts for one person’s being the same as another person over time is a matter of
psychological continuity. This can include (but is not limited to) continuity between memories,
apparent memories, beliefs, thoughts, and intentions (Kind, 42). (The including apparent
memories as opposed to just memories is to avoid the charge of circularity; apparent or quasimemories do not suffer from the charge of circularity that the original version of the
psychological theory—the memory theory—does.) Finally, there is what I will call the soul view
(what Kind calls the “further fact” view); according to this view, personal identity is not
reducible to physical or psychological facts (hence Kind’s “further fact” label) as the other views
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posit, but rather is due to some other irreducible “further fact” (43). Because this is usually
considered to be some sort of non-physical or immaterial soul, I will call it the soul theory,
though objections to this theory usually apply equally to soul views, bare particular views,
substratum views, and other versions of the “further fact” view.
With the basic theoretical groundwork laid, let us first consider the physical continuity
theory. For the purposes of this paper, we will focus primarily on the version of the theory which
holds that bodily continuity is what matters as this is the most common version, as opposed to
versions such as the brain theory (which holds brain continuity is what matters) or animalism
(which holds that biological continuity is what matters). Despite some benefits this may have
intuitively (it seems like my body is important to who I am in some way, there are problem cases
for this theory; namely case where it seems there are multiple (different) persons with a single
physical manifestation or body. If these cases do in fact show this, it seems hard to explain how
different persons could exist within the same body with the same bodily continuity, if this
continuity is sufficient for personal identity. This is most clearly seen in cases of dissociative
identity disorder (DID) and cases of brain bisection (see Nagel, 1971). In such cases, it seems as
though there are different persons with the same physical body and thus with the same bodily
continuity; if there can be different persons with the same bodily continuity, then bodily
continuity cannot be sufficient for personhood—thus the physical theory would not be sufficient
for providing an account of personal identity and would be false.
In some cases, such as those of brain bisection, under the appropriate conditions, it
appears that each hemisphere of the brain is operating independently and functioning as a distinct
center of consciousness, unable to communicate with each other and capable of communicating
on their own; if this is an accurate understanding of what is going on in cases of brain bisection,
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then there appears to be different persons within the same body (and thus with the same bodily
continuity leading up to the moment of continuity) and therefore, the bodily continuity theory is
false. It seems like in cases of DID that there are also multiple persons within one body. One
might reply that in such cases, there are simply multiple characterizations of one person within
one body, rather than multiple persons; that is, while it is one metaphysical person, this person
(at different times) takes on different characterizations. To address this response it is important to
first clarify what is meant by characterization.
Characterization, roughly, is what makes some person the person that they are. While it
seems that most people are simply consistently “who they are” (very roughly meaning that they
seem to think and act similarly throughout time), it is perfectly fitting with our experience for
people to “be” (i.e. act, speak, and behave, etc.) different in some situations than others. For
example, when one is around their high school friends with whom they have not seen or spent
time with for ten years, they can “regress” back to who they used to be ten years ago. It seems,
one might argue, perfectly plausible to think then that characterization changes can be a bit more
extreme than such situations—in such cases, one person can experience different
characterizations at different times; one’s characterization does not seem to simply be fixed in a
one to one correspondence between persons and their characterization since it seems that one
person can have different characterizations. Some might argue that this response relies on
undercutting our intuitions about personhood (despite any intuitive benefits a physical view
might have; pp. 75ff) or that it is not a proper analysis of cases such as those of DID (99-100).
More importantly, even if one grants this explanation in cases of DID, it does not seem to be as
applicable to cases of brain bisection, unless one wants to argue that a single person can have
multiple characterizations at the same time (as the left and right hemispheres seem to be distinct
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centers of consciousness) which seems to be a very difficult argument to make. Thus, there are
very difficult problem cases with the physical theory, and resolving them seems to rely on very
strange conceptual moves which might undercut our intuitions, and even in these solutions do
not seem to solve every problem case.
Next, let us consider the soul theory. As previously mentioned, the criticisms raised
against a “soul” theory (which posits some kind of unchanging, immaterial soul as the basis for
one’s personal identity) apply to other versions of what Kind calls the “further fact” theory, thus
we will focus on souls for simplicity sake. This view has some very attractive qualities, at least
prima facie; for example, it provides a way for one to have strict numerical identity between a
person at two different times, as the soul remains unchanging over time and there also is a certain
appeal to having some sort of “you” beyond your physical or psychological traits (which may
seem to be “accidental” to who ‘you’ are—i.e. it may seem you could have a different body or a
different psychology). Oftentimes, however, this theory is partially, if not wholly, motivated by
concerns or beliefs unrelated to personal identity (at least directly), such as religious beliefs (43),
however there is some intuitive appeal towards the view that what makes us the same person
over time is more than either physical continuity or psychological continuity due to the
aforementioned reasons.
Nonetheless, there are some problems with the soul theory. For example, in the case of
brain bisection, there is a question about what appears to be multiple persons in one body. In this
case, if we assume that what makes on the same over time is an immaterial soul, is it the case
that there are two souls occupying one body, or is it one soul functioning as two centers of
consciousness? In either case, it seems strange to appeal to a soul without prior commitments to
their existence; on the one hand, it seems to face the same difficulties as the physical view, and
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on the other hand it just seems to not be an accurate analysis of what occurs in brain bisection.
Similar problems arise in the cases of people who suffer from DID when appealing to a soul to
explain the view.
Further, there are unique problems for the soul theorist. There are two primary problems:
a synchronic problem and a diachronic problem. The first is: what individuates souls at any given
time? If one posits that souls are necessarily attached to a body, then one could argue that the
body is what individuates the soul. However, if this is the case, the soul theory suffers from the
same criticisms as the body theory just with the addition of a soul. The same could be said for
attaching a psychology or mind to the soul; it seems to face the same problems of the regular
theory. If souls are not necessarily embodied (or attached to a psychology), however, there seems
to be no way to differentiate between souls. What is it that makes it the case that one soul exists
instead of two? What is it that would make it such that there are two souls instead of five, or five
instead of ten? If there is no difference between one soul or two, or two souls or five, then it
seems the concept of soul is almost (if not certainly) incoherent. Any features which might
distinguish souls (such as characteristics or properties relevant to a characterization or necessary
embodiment) seems to suffer from the problems (much like the problems for embodied souls)
raised for other theories.
Further still, let us assume it is indeed possible to distinguish between souls at a single
time. Then comes the diachronic question; in virtue of what is one soul the same over time? It
seems here that the only (or at least the most common) answer would be by connecting a soul to
some person, but such an answer would obviously presuppose a person’s identity over time. This
however would, of course, be circular and thus an unacceptable answer. Thus, the soul theory
seems to suffer from both a unique synchronic and diachronic objection––the theory seems
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unable to distinguish between souls at any single time without suffering from problems faced by
other theories and is unable to account for some soul being the same over time in a non-circular
way.
Now, let us consider the psychological theory. This theory has the benefit of a very
strong intuitiveness. It does seem as though my continuity of psychology has a lot to do with my
being the same person over time. We, in fact, have many movies which have been made off
similar premises. One example of this would be the popular movie Freaky Friday. In this movie,
a mother and daughter switch bodies. The mother, in the daughter’s body, recognizes herself as
the mother, simply in the wrong body. In such movies, despite two people “swapping” bodies,
they are still themselves, and recognize themselves as so because of some kind of
psychologically continuity. Not only do such stories make sense (when they would not, if a body
theory is correct), but their prevalence further cements the intuitive pull of this view, thus
providing further support for the view. Certainly every view enjoys some level of intuitive
support, however our intuitions regarding psychological continuity seem stronger than many of
our other intuitions.
Nonetheless, there is one primary objection to the psychological theory: the problem of
reduplication. The problem of reduplication attempts to show cases in which there are two
distinct people (and being distinct, they are not identical) who have the same psychological
continuity, thus attempting to show that psychological continuity is not sufficient for identity.
(This approach is similar to the one given earlier against a bodily continuity approach.) Kind
provides an example of the problem in this scenario: suppose some person uses a teleportation
pad, but the teleportation pad malfunctions and recreates the original person in two different
places. In this case, they are clearly distinct (say, one reappears in New York, while the other in
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Los Angeles), yet they have the same psychological continuity with the original (53ff). There are
three possible answers to the problem of reduplication: either (1) both are identical to the
original, (2) one is identical to the original but the other is not, or (3) neither are identical to the
original.
If one opts for the first option, there is a contradiction. As noted in the example, the new
persons are distinct from one another, and thus cannot be identical. Yet because identity is
transitive, if one argues that both are identical to the original, then this would entail that the new
persons are identical, and thus we have arrived at a contradiction. Thus (1) is unacceptable. If
one goes with (2), there is an issue regarding which person would be identical. Considering both
persons have the exact same psychological continuity up until the moment of their creation, any
reason given for one being identical to the original over the other seems like it could be argued
for the other, thus reducing the decision to arbitrariness and thereby rendering (2) unacceptable.
Finally, if one accepts that in a normal teleportation case the person created after the
teleportation (whether in the intended destination or not) would be identical to the original, then
(3) seems untenable, as there is no difference between a normal teleportation case and the
problem case except the creation of the extra person. Both persons in the problem case would
hold the same relation to the original as the recreated person would in the normal case, and
therefore it seems that if a teleported person would be identical to the original in a normal case,
they should be in the problem case also, rendering (3) as unacceptable.
In response to this problem, I argue that the problem of reduplication can be solved by
appealing to survival as opposed to strict numerical identity. There are two issues with requiring
numerical identity in discussions of personal identity: first, that it is almost impossible to
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achieve, and second, that it is not what is sought in discussions of personal identity in everyday
discourse.
First, numerical identity appears to be a bar set too high for personal identity. For two
objects to be numerically identical is for them to share all and only the same properties. This
seems almost impossible to achieve in cases of personal identity. We are constantly changing
and taking on new properties. One can easily see this when cases are spread over a longer period
of time, say from my 10-year-old self and my 30-year-old self, or even my 20-year-old self, but
it still holds true between myself today and myself yesterday. Even more so, every minute we are
receiving different stimuli, performing different actions, having different thoughts, our cells are
changing, etc., so it seems as though we are, on some level, constantly changing; thus, whether
one is a psychological theorist or a physical theorist, there seems to be constant change going on,
making numerical identity impossible. (Potential ways around this might look something like
having all properties being time-indexed, such that you always possess every property, they are
just only actualized at specific times; this, however, has a large drawback in the sense of being
somewhat counterintuitive and extremely complicated. For example, saying that the one-year-old
me had the property of being six feet tall, it just would not be actualized until I was eighteen
[thus being time-indexed to me at 18-years old] seems very bizarre.) Thus, numerical identity
seems almost impossible to achieve, so if this is what is required for personal identity, then it
also seems almost impossible that we could have any sort of personal identity.
Furthermore, it seems that when we ask something like how my spouse is the same
person I married, we recognize they are not numerically identical to who we married, but that
they are still (in some way) the same person despite not being numerically identical. In our
discourse, most people do not look for some sort of strict logical identity when asking about the
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persistence of the self, but rather are looking for some more loose sense which can still connect
some person from one time to another. Thus, I think numerical identity fails to both achieve what
is meant in our everyday discussions, and is also a far more difficult bar to achieve.
I propose that personal identity be thought of in terms of survival, rather than strict
numerical identity. What do I mean by survival? Kind states survival to be “the continuation of
my self-narrative” (137). I, however, object to this definition that it fails to solve certain problem
cases, partially due to some ambiguity in exactly what a self-narrative is and whether or not they
require active reflection and forming of the narrative. If a self-narrative does require conscious or
active reflection on one’s life and experiences, then in the case of people who do not actively
form a self-narrative, these people fail to “survive” due to their self-narrative not continuing (in
virtue of not existing). Even if a self-narrative does not require conscious reflection, there are
cases of people who cannot form a self-narrative and therefore can neither be people nor are
capable of surviving due to their inability to form a self-narrative. So it seems then that either
way, this definition might exclude people from surviving who we would want to say survive,
simply because they do not form a narrative; or it prevent agents from being persons who we
would want to say are because they cannot. Even further, there are also people whose selfnarratives are drastically out-of-line with reality, which seems problematic to make this the
benchmark of survival.
Thus, I argue this definition of survival is insufficient, and instead propose that we should
think of survival to be, roughly, the continuation of a first-person perspective, rather than in
terms of a continuation of a self-narrative. While one having a self-narrative would require one
having a first-person perspective, a first-person perspective does not entail one having a selfnarrative. This definition thus avoids some of the difficulties which face the one presented by
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Kind at least insofar as it requires no active reflection or forming of your narrative from the
“self’ experiencing it. Furthermore, in cases where someone suffers from some condition like
amnesia and their self-narrative disappears, their first-person perspective continues, and thus
they can still survive as themselves despite such problems. Further still, it deals well with cases
where someone simply fails to have their narrative accurately reflect reality because what
matters is their having a first-person perspective, rather than their self-narrative itself.
Baker (2008) conceives of a first-person perspective as “the ability to conceive of oneself
as oneself … it requires that one can conceive of oneself as the referent of the first-person
pronoun independently of any name or description of oneself … Even if I had total amnesia and
didn’t know my name or anything at all about my past, I could still think of myself as myself”
(381, emphasis original). While this is oftentimes demonstrated in the English language by the
use of first-person pronouns in first-person sentences such as “I wish I had a million dollars,” it
is more than simply the ability to use first-person pronouns, and does not require it.
While I think this is on the right track, one modification I would propose is rather than a
first-person perspective being the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself (which, at least in this
sense, sounds like a category error to define a perspective as an ability), a first-person
perspective (and actually) simply is one’s conceiving of themselves as themselves. It is one’s
point of view from where they view and experience the world and themselves. We all (at least
seemingly) have an intuitive view of where we are located and our awareness of ourselves—this
is what one’s first-person perspective is.
One final issue to be resolved in this definition would be to answer: what does it mean
exactly for there to be continuity of some first-person perspective? The continuity of one’s firstperson perspective, I take it, to be a sort of subset of one’s psychological continuity, as it relies
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on certain psychological capacities, and its continuation seems to depend on a continuity of these
capacities. On a psychological level, I am admittedly unsure as to what capacities or faculties
this depends on and to what extent; however, one’s subjective experience of their first-person
perspective continuing seems to depend on there being an appropriate causal connection between
the perspective at two different times. Let’s imagine two perspectives at two different times, say
the perspective I had this morning making breakfast and the perspective I have now writing this
paper. One could think about it as like two points on a line, where the points are perspectives at
any given time and the line is the entire path of that perspective over time. What accounts for this
being the same perspective over time (or being “on the same line”) is the causal connection
between the two—or at the very least it seems that way to me.
With a definition of survival laid out, and a case made for thinking of personal identity in
terms of survival rather than numerical identity, I will address objections to this version of the
psychological theory. (Despite arguing that we should think of personal identity not in terms of
numerical identity, the term “personal identity” will continue to be used due to its entrenched
nature in these discussions; however, “personal identity” should be recognized from here on out
to refer to survival, rather than strict numerical identity.) First, one might object that my account
of survival presupposes identity; second, that it fails to resolve problem cases; third, that this
definition suffers from problems like gaps in one’s first-person perspective; and finally, one
might raise questions about cases where one’s perspective is far from their body (i.e. flying a
virtual reality drone on another continent).
The first objection one might raise is that survival on this view presupposes some sort of
identity. The idea can be most clearly seen by speaking of my survival (the continuation of my
first-person perspective), rather than survival in the abstract. Roughly, the objection is that if
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survival is based on the continuation of my first-person perspective, then because it is my first
person-perspective, it seems to presuppose that there is some enduring ‘me’ behind it. Because of
this, one might think the definition ultimately in circular, as it defines identity in terms of
survival, but this survival presupposes identity.
While this is true that there seems to be something behind the first-person perspective
which possesses it, this problem seems to arise for any theory (with the exception of the soul
theory, which will be addressed later). On other versions of the psychological theory, for
example, one could ask about the ‘me’ possessing the psychology which is continuous; on a
body theory, one could argue that having bodily continuity assumes that it is the same body. The
theory (like these others), however, bases the identity of the possessor of some psychology,
perspective, or body in terms of that continuity of a psychology, a continuation of a first-person
perspective, or of a body. So, what makes it my first-person perspective and my survival is the
fact that I am the one who possess this perspective which is appropriately continuous (i.e.
causally connected) such as to account for survival. In the case of a soul theory, while this does
seem to have an unchanging soul which endures without something else behind it, the soul
theory faces unique problems of its own (as previously mentioned). Furthermore, this could
likely be chalked up to imprecision in our language. When we ask “How am I the same person I
was ten years ago?” we are already assuming that I am the same person, we are just asking in
virtue of what is this the case. However, we also recognize (as discussed on p. 8) that we are not
numerically identical, but when we ask how we are the ‘same,’ this word carries in our minds
both the loose, imprecise sense and the strict, logical sense, thus leading to confusion in our
discussions because of these constraints of our language.

Martin 14
The second objection is that it fails to solve two of the biggest problems in personal
identity: reduplication (which was discussed earlier; also known as fission) and fusion. The
problem of fusion can be seen by an inverse scenario to the problem of fission. Imagine two
people step onto teleportation pads in different places, but due to a malfunction are fused
together at the same location at the end. The resulting person is a mix of both the original
persons––personality and physical traits combine and are, for lack of a better phrase, “averaged
out” so that the new person has a mix of both persons. Each of these problems will be considered
in turn.
First, the problem of fission can be more easily resolved by survival. Of the three options
presented, numerical identity entails that (3) is correct, neither of the new persons are
numerically identical to the original. On a survival account one would agree that (3) is correct––
neither is numerically identical to the original––however, this does not matter, because we are
looking for survival, rather than numerical identity. If we think in terms of survival rather than
identity, then we can reformulate the choices as follows: (1’) the original survives through both,
(2’) the original survives through one but not the other, or (3’) the original survives through
neither. Both (2’) and (3’) have the same problems presented earlier, however (1’) avoids the
problem presented. The problem given to (1) is that if both are identical, then both persons are
distinct, and distinct persons are not identical. However, identity is transitive, and thus the
original would be identical to two distinct persons, thus resulting in a contradiction. On (1’),
however, this can be avoided. Survival, unlike identity, is not transitive and thus there is no
contradiction is holding the original to survive through two distinct persons. While this may
seem strange, it also seems true. If you were duplicated into two persons with two different firstperson perspectives, you would survive through both. Each would, of course, believe themselves
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to be the ‘real’ you, but this would not change the fact that you would survive through both, and
neither would be identical to you. Your first-person perspective continues through both of the
new persons, so you would survive through them both, and thus both new persons would be you
in the same sense.
Fusion cases are a bit stranger due to their nature, but it still seems that they are
resolvable. In the case of fusion, both original persons would survive through the new person.
Each person would likely feel as though the first-person perspective being experienced would be
their own, as opposed to the others, but both would have their first-person perspective continued
through this new person. Thus, they would both survive through this one person, so both persons
would “be” this one person (and should they ever fission again, would presumably go back to
surviving through their own bodies).
While it may seem strange to think of our identity as being able to branch or fuse, this is
because of our ingrained thoughts about personal identity and its connection to numerical
identity (at least in much of Western thought). Had evolution gone differently and we evolved to
the same sort of cognitive capacities (being capable of our first-person perspective, for example)
however we animals who reproduced by binary fission, for example, our conception of our
personal identity would be quite different. Problem cases in personal identity demonstrate, in my
opinion, the need to jettison the traditional account of numerical identity in favor of something
like this survival account. Outside of the traditional thoughts about personal identity being based
on numerical identity that we still hold onto, it is hard to explain what exactly is so strange about
these cases where a person survives through two different persons.
The third objection to be considered is that concerning some other problem cases, such as
gaps in one’s first-person perspective. If the mark of survival is the continuation of a first-person
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perspective, then there are times when one has gaps in their first-person perspective, which
would entail that during these times they stop surviving and stop being the same person. While
this definition avoids some of the more difficult gaps that a narrative view might face (like
Kind’s proposed definition), there are still gaps in any first-person perspective, for example
when one is sleeping or if one falls into a coma.
In response to this objection, I propose a slight refinement of the definition of survival.
Rather than thinking about it in terms of the continuation of an actual first-person perspective,
survival ought to be thought of as the continuation of the capacity for a first-person perspective
such that some person S survives if and only if their capacity for a first-person perspective
continues. This modification allows us to easily analyze cases where one has gaps in their firstperson perspective. While one is asleep, despite no longer being able to conceive of themselves
as themselves (have their first-person perspective), they still maintain the capacity for this
perspective. (This also helps more easily demonstrate the relationship between this conception of
survival and the psychological continuity theory, as the capacity for having a first-person
perspective is presumably part of one’s psychological capacities, and its continuity accounts for
the continuation of the capacity for first-person perspectives.) So in the case of someone falling
into a coma (or even just being asleep), they can still be the same person they were earlier in life
when they were capable of this in virtue of their still having that same capacity for that firstperson perspective (i.e. when they wake up or come out of the coma, their perspective
continues). (At what point exactly one first develops or loses these capacities, or how early or
late in one’s life, I am admittedly unsure of, as I am unaware of all the psychological capacities
which play into this ability, however it seems then that one’s personal identity would begin with
these capacities and end when they lose them—whether that is at some point in childhood or if
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one could lose them due to extreme mental deterioration before death. An important practical
point regarding a concern about ethical questions surrounding this would be that one might be,
but is not necessarily, a moral patient without having this sort of capacity; this theory brings no
bearing on whether they are or not.)
The fourth and final objection I will consider is regarding the location of one’s
perspective. Imagine that in the United States some person puts on a virtual reality headset. All
of the sudden, their perspective is in Afghanistan. The question this raises is, where are you? Are
you with your perspective, thousands of miles from your body and ‘you’ before you enter the
virtual reality, or are you located where your perspective is?
As a simple answer, on this theory one would be located where your perspective is;
however, this might be different than one would think. While you might feel as though you are in
Afghanistan through the virtual reality headset, there is an important sense in which you are not,
but rather your perspective is mediated by the headset. When one is in the movie theatre, it is not
as though they are ‘where’ the movie is, despite the potential of them to become captivated by
their perspective in the theatre.
On the other hand, in James Cameron’s Avatar we see a very different way in which this
perspective is portrayed. In this movie, the main character enters into an ‘avatar’ and, through
this avatar, lives and acts on another planet across the universe. In this movie, it certainly seems
as though he is where his perspective is (namely, in his acting and functioning through the
avatar). But what is then that distinguishes these two cases? One potential answer could be the
medium through which one’s perspective is changed (i.e., watching on a screen versus acting
through a body), but regardless, one might argue that if what matters is one’s perspective and
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where it is, that the medium through which one’s perspective is somewhere or experiences
something does not matter.
In response, I think part of the reason such cases seem confusing is that when we think of
a scenario like Avatar where one’s body is in one location but their psychology and perspective
is elsewhere, the confusion comes from the intuitive pull (as mentioned earlier) that a body
theory enjoys. It does seem to us that part of what makes us the same person is our body but, like
the soul theory, there seem to be issues that might outweigh such prima facie appeals. Thus, if it
is examined from this psychological perspective, one would be, in a real sense, located where
their perspective is. However, part of this issue may be resolved by the earlier appeal to survival.
We might think that if our “real” body is destroyed while our perspective is elsewhere (or vice
versa) that we might cease to exist. Yet, because the relationship of survival simply requires the
continuity of a perspective, one could survive despite their original body being destroyed or a
medium through which their perspective experiences the world being destroyed, as long as the
perspective continued elsewhere. So, if, like in Avatar, my “real” (original?) body was destroyed,
but my perspective was able to be continued through this avatar (such as through a complete
psychological upload), I would still survive through it. On the other hand, in the case of your
perspective being through something like a movie theatre, your perspective could not continue if
your original body was destroyed, and thus it does not seem as though “you” or your perspective
are truly there. So, in response to this challenge, the answer depends highly upon how one
considers your perspective (or the capacity for this perspective, as mentioned earlier in response
to a previous objection) as being “transferred” through these mediums—the location of one’s self
depends on where one’s perspective is, and this location depends (at least in part) on whether
surviving or not depends on whether one’s original body is still the center of one’s (capacity for)
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a perspective (through movies or virtual reality) or whether or not one’s perspective could
continue without this body. It seems as though the location of one’s self depends on the location
of one’s capacity for this perspective, so if one’s capacity cannot continue without one’s body,
then their “location” would be with this capacity. If it can (i.e. if their psychology and
consciousness is uploaded into an avatar or computer), then they are located where this capacity
is.
Thus, I argue that both the soul theory and physical theory face very difficult problems,
while the psychological enjoys more benefits with less problems. Moreover, the problems with a
psychological theory (such as the problem of reduplication) can be resolved by appealing to a
survival account of personal identity rather than numerical identity. Survival seems to be not
only a much more realistic bar set for identity, but also resolves problem cases such as fusion and
fission. Many of the problems in personal identity arise from the impossibility of achieving
numerical identity in problem cases––impossibility which arises upon reflection, even in
everyday life. While problem cases are certainly strange on a survival account, they are no less
strange than they would be on any other theory with the benefit of providing more plausible
answers, given the rejection of the need for numerical identity, and I believe I have sufficiently
argued that objections to a survival account fail.
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